Evidence - Physician - Patient Privilege - Applicability to Communication Between State Mental Hospital Psychiatrist and Criminal Internee by Zilber, Norman A., S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 54 Issue 3 
1956 
Evidence - Physician - Patient Privilege - Applicability to 
Communication Between State Mental Hospital Psychiatrist and 
Criminal Internee 
Norman A. Zilber S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Evidence Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, and the 
Law and Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Norman A. Zilber S.Ed., Evidence - Physician - Patient Privilege - Applicability to Communication Between 
State Mental Hospital Psychiatrist and Criminal Internee, 54 MICH. L. REV. 423 (1956). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/10 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1956] RECENT DECISIONS 423 
EVIDENCE - PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE -A.PPUCABILITY TO COMMUNI· 
CATION BETWEEN STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL PSYCHIATRIST AND CRIMINAL IN-
TERNEE-Defendant was committed to a public mental hospital1 before stand-
ing trial on an indictment for robbery. One year later he was brought to 
trial after being discharged from the hospital as mentally competent. His 
only defense was insanity. The psychiatrist who had been appointed by the 
court to examine the defendant testified in support of this defense. The 
prosecution, in turn, introduced the testimony of the hospital psychiatrist 
1 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. (1952) §4244, p. 2579. 
424 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
who had attended the defendant during his internment. This psychiatrist 
was instructed by the trial court that communications between him and the 
defendant were not privileged. Accordingly, he testified that the defendant 
had told him that his insanity was feigned. It was the hospital psychiatrist's 
belief that at the time of the hospital examinations the defendant was 
competent to distinguish between right and wrong. Defendant was found 
guilty and convicted. On appeal1 held, reversed, one judge dissenting. In-
formation obtained by a psychiatrist of a public mental hospital while 
attending an inmate comes within the provisions of the District of Columbia 
privilege statute2 which makes such confidential information inadmissible 
in evidence. Taylor v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 222 F. (2d) 398. 
The common law did not provide a privilege for communications be-
tween physician and patient.3 However, statutes enacted by thirty-one 
states4 exclude such testimony and preserve the confidences between physi-
cian and patient in order to encourage the seeking of medical care.5 Al-
though it can be argued that this privilege applies to psychiatrists simply 
because they are physicians, 6 distinctions are made between the case where 
the patient is examined only as to- his mental fitness7 and the case where he 
is treated for mental illness.8 In the former, the communications are not 
privileged because the purpose of the usual doctor-patient relationship, the 
seeking of treatment, is not present. Since the defendant in the principal 
case was committed for treatment, the issue of the statute's applicability 
relates to the broader question of whether the necessary relationship exists 
'between a state hospital psychiatrist and a committed inmate.9 A psychia-
2 "In the courts of the District of Columbia no physician or surgeon shall be per-
mitted, without the consent of the person afflicted, or of his legal representative, to dis-
close any information, confidential in its nature, which he shall have acquired in attend-
ing a patient in a professional capacity and which was necessary to enable him to act 
in that capacity ..•. " D.C. Code (1951) §14-308. 
3 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §101 (1954). 
4 For a recent compilation, see 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 384 (1952). 
5 See Stayner v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E. (2d) 496 (1949); 8 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 
3d ed., §2380a, p. 810 (1940). 
6 See 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 384 (1952) for a discussion of the applicability of the priv-
ilege to psychiatrists absent a statutory privilege for doctors generally. Two states which 
have no privilege for physicians have recently enacted one for clinical psychologists. 
Ga. Code Ann. (1937; Supp. 1951) tit. 84, §84-3118; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §319.110. 
'i See 107 A.L.R. 1491 (1937); Hopkins v. State, 212 Miss. 772, 55 S. (2d) 467 (1951). 
s Casson v. Schoenfeld, 166 Wis. 401, 166 N.W. 23 (1918); Linscott v. Hughbanks, 
140 Kan. 353, 37 P. (2d) 26 (1934). 
9 In the principal case, the dissent believed that the rationale of the cases which hold 
that no doctor-patient relationship exists when an accused person is examined by gov-
ernment doctors should apply, drawing a distinction between government officers and 
private physicians, rather than between examination and treatment. Supporting this 
view are Liske v. Liske, (Sup. Ct. 1912) 135 N.Y.S. 176 (hospital records required by 
Mental Hygiene Law held admissible in annulment proceedings) and Scolavino v. State 
of New York, 187 Misc. 253, 62 N.Y.S. (2d) 17 (1946), affd. 297 N.Y. 460, 74 N.E. (2d) 
174 (1947) (hospital records required by Mental Hygiene Law held admissible in action 
against the state for negligence). For later New York cases to the contrary, see note 11 
infra. 
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trist must encourage the patient to divulge his innermost thoughts,10 and, 
when a committed patient cooperates in this method of treatment in order 
to further his recovery, his statements to the therapist should fall within the 
protection of the statute. Accordingly, most courts have held that the privi-
lege applies to communications between public hospital physicians and 
committed patients.11 Under the privilege statutes not only must the infor-
mation be disclosed in confidence to the psychiatrist in his professional 
capacity, but it must also be related to the patient's treatment.12 Since any 
statement a mental patient might make to his doctor could conceivably be 
related to his treatment, and since hospital psychiatrists usually conduct 
their consultations in their professional capacity,13 these requirements 
ordinarily would be met. Nevertheless, in criminal insanity cases policy may 
dictate that the privilege oe lifted in order to permit the better administra-
tion of justice.14 In several states the privilege of the statutes is limited to 
civil actions15 or there are specific exemptions for certain criminal indict-
ments.16 The statute in the principal case removes the privilege in homi-
cide and criminal battery cases when required in the interest of public 
justice.17 In assessing the value of the privilege as it applies to communica-
tions between a state hospital psychiatrist and a committed criminal patient, 
several considerations must be taken into account. First, the preservation 
of the privilege would tend to promote the early recovery of the criminally 
insane by encouraging them to disclose freely their repressed thoughts. 
Secondly, it may be argued that the state sets a trap for the patient by 
committing him pending trial, only to use statements he made in confidence 
to a hospital doctor to convict him when and if he can stand trial. On the 
10 GUTIMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952). 
11 Westphal v. State, 191 Misc. 688, 79 N.Y.S. (2d) 634 (1948); McGrath v. State, 
200 Misc. 165, 104 N.Y.S. (2d) 882 (1950). See also Lumpkin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
75 Ohio App. 310, 62 N.E. (2d) 189 (1945), affd. 146 Ohio St. 25, 64 N.E. (2d) 63 (1945); 
22 A.L.R. 1217 (1923). But see note 9 supra. 
12 See, e.g., D.C. Code (1951) §14-308. 
13 Exceptions will of c.ourse arise, as in Commonwealth v. Sykes, 353 Pa. 392, 45 A. 
(2d) 43 (1946), where a communication to the hospital psychiatrist was held not privileged 
because he received it in his capacity as superintendent and not as physician. 
14 For other situations where the privilege is denied for policy reasons, see 8 Wm-
MORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2385, p. 825 (1940); 45 A.L.R. 1357 (1926); 2 A.L.R. (2d) 647 
(1948). 
15 2 Idaho Code (1948) §9-203; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1949) tit. 93, §93-701-4; Ore. 
Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 44, §44.040; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 28, §328; S.D. Code 
(1939) tit. 36, §36.0101; Utah Code Ann. (1953) tit. 78, §78-24-8. 
16 D.C. Code (1951) §14-308 (homicide or criminal battery); Wis. Stat. (1953) c. 325, 
§325.21 (homicide). A few states make special provision for a criminal privilege. Ariz. 
Code Ann. (1940) §23-103; La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 15, §476; Minn. Stat. (1954) §595.02; 
Miss. Code Ann. (1944; Supp. 1954) §1697; Wash. Rev. Code (1952) tit. 10, §10.52020. 
17 D.C. Code (1951) §14-308. Application of the "public justice" criterion is a mat-
ter of discretion with the trial judge. Catoe v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 16. 
Cf. N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953) §8-53; ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, rules 222, 223 (1942). 
In the principal case, the dissenting opinion urges judicial extension of the statutory 
exception to the situation presented. 
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other hand, retention of the privilege permits the accused to select as wit-
nesses only those psychiatrists who will testify favorably and to silence 
those who could expose a fabricated insanity defense.18 In light of the 
severe criticism of the doctor-patient privilege generally,19 it may be time 
for the legislatures to review the policy of the statutes, at least as they apply 
to criminal inmates and state hospital psychiatrists. 
Norman A. Zilber, S. Ed. 
18 The problem of false insanity defenses could possibly be sol;ed by an improved 
administration of the insanity tests given before the criminal is committed. 
19 Chafee, "Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing 
the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?" 52 YALE L. J. 607 (1943); McCORMICK, EVI· 
DENCE, §108 (1954); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2380a (1940). 
